How Much Security Do We Need?  An Alternative Post-Mumbai Perspective.

Tariq Ghaffur’s piece offers a good analysis of events and issues arising and draws some sound conclusions as they apply to the Indian sub-continent, though these might not all translate to the UK and Europe given the different societal and political contexts.  One can agree with the view that the type and scale of the Mumbai assault is the latest example of why a new way of thinking about and meeting current terror threats is needed, but a debate still remains to be had over not just how much security is enough, but who decides (and by implication, pays).  And these should not be first order decisions or undertaken solely by Police Commissioners or individual Ministers.

In the UK, one might take a radical view that ‘why bother’ beyond current measures?  Determined terrorists will always succeed as history has shown, though the Heathrow attackers in August 2006 were all successfully arrested before anywhere near the airport.  But we may all just have to get used to accepting a level of risk and casualties as part of modern life; what is better, to live life without oppressive security and intrusion but risk a few casualties now and then, or live under a ‘Big Brother’ state?  Even with oppressive security, we are likely to still take casualties from one terrorist or another, while increasingly draconian protective measures risk fomenting terrorism and subjecting us all to a more a miserable life in any event.  The ‘cost-benefit’ part of risk management is usually that least considered!   

The current Police doctrine of command levels may well need some review and training at all levels changed if they are to deal successfully with the scale, violence and dynamism of Mumbai style attacks here.  For example, these – fortunately still rare events – will demand a greater level of autonomy and capability to act devolving to Police at the scene than has hitherto been required (Jean-Charles’ shooting has some important echoes here).    

Intelligence is the key as TQ suggests, and society and governments would of course want to do what was possible to prevent a catastrophic terrorist attack such as a biological or nuclear event.  The jury is still out on Mumbai over the extent to which rogue Pakistani Intelligence (ISI) and other state elements may have colluded in the Indian attacks, but the Pakistani government’s unwillingness to share the results of their own investigation suggest that an element of this was present.    

But before we commit to large-scale expansion of armed police capability and other, more oppressive measures running in to 2012, time and money might be better spent on developing an ‘intelligence-led strategy’ based on indicators and warnings that extends into areas where we have been poor at joining up (or collecting) information for analysis from which ‘intelligence’ (as opposed to merely information) can be derived.  That would require some significant shifts in policy and the strategic deployment of information technology in a way that hitherto has not been a hallmark of underpinning our own homeland security.  But first off, society needs to consider and debate the strategic question of just ‘how much security’ is enough and what is and isn’t tolerable.